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Responding to Nietzsche: The
Constructive Power of
Destruktion
Francis J. Mootz III
Penn State University, Carlisle
As a student of Hans-Georg Gadamer, and later a translator and important
commentator on Gadamer’s philosophy, P. Christopher Smith is widely acknowledged to be a leading hermeneutical philosopher. In a series of works, Smith has
argued that Gadamer provides an important corrective to Nietzsche’s caustic
critical challenges, but that Gadamer’s hermeneutics has no relevance for legal
theory because law is just the manifestation of will to power. In this paper I argue
that Smith misunderstands the nature of legal practice. Starting with a re-reading
of the debate between Gadamer and Jacques Derrida about the legacy of
Nietzsche’s philosophy, I argue that Gadamer responds to Nietzsche’s challenge
in a manner that is exemplified in the critical dimensions of legal practice. Using
the example of family law that Smith offers, I contend that Smith underestimates
the critical and interpretive elements inherent in legal practice and captured in
Gadamer’s philosophy. I conclude that Gadamer offers a persuasive answer to
Nietzsche’s challenge. Law, Culture and the Humanities 2007; 3: 127  154

I. Recovering Shades of Gray in Nietzsche’s Shadow
More than one hundred years after his death, Nietzsche’s long shadow
continues to cloud the self-assurance of legal reasoning to the point of
casting legality itself into doubt. There is no convincing demonstration
that law can survive Nietzsche’s scathing insights, which are carried
forward today through various critical interventions; there is no alleviation
of the suspicion that the ‘‘rule of law’’ is yet another modernist fable that
conceals the play of power. For the most part, theorists either turn away
from the corrosive effects of Nietzschean critique, or they revel in the
anarchy seemingly invited by Nietzsche. In this article, I respond to
Nietzsche’s formidable challenge more directly by way of confession and
avoidance: Even if we accept Nietzsche’s claims in their full radicality, I
argue that it is possible to defend both a critical engagement with law and
the critical potential of law. I endorse Gadamer’s thesis that Destruktion is
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a constructive power that girds legal practice, even if all too often this
critical power is suppressed.
Nietzsche’s as-yet unanswered challenge to law has been carefully
recounted by P. Christopher Smith in the course of his efforts to recover
‘‘the hermeneutics of original argument.’’1 Smith locates original argument
in consultation and deliberation with others. He describes how the
communal understanding of reasoning that animates the pre-literate
Homeric epics  in which one takes counsel with others by hearing them
and feeling the force of their demands  has, since Plato, increasingly been
covered over by the univocal and demonstrative model of modern
argumentation in which insular contestants seek to demonstrate a truth that
they have seen with their solitary mind’s-eye. Smith lauds Nietzsche for
forcefully undermining the pretense of logical-deductive legal reasoning and
the conceit of demonstrative legal argumentation by uncovering the
untamed, embodied pathos that resides at the heart of all reasoning and
persuasion. Unfortunately, Smith charges, law turns a deaf ear to this
challenge and embraces a hopelessly abstract model of reasoning. Smith
concludes that ‘‘judicial reasoning . . . has effectively displaced and buried
the original ways we exist and talk with each other in availing ourselves of
the words said from time out of mind that we have first heard from others.’’2
Smith’s creative readings of Greek philosophy and drama in the course of
recovering the experience of original argument inspire me to undertake the
complementary project of investigating the role of original argument in legal
practice. By doing so, however, I challenge Smith’s characterization of legal
practice as the institutionalization of an inauthentic form of understanding.
At first, Smith suggested that his work on original argument has ‘‘important,
challenging consequences’’ for ‘‘judicial theory,’’ and he emphasized that all
reasoning, ‘‘even judicial reasoning, originates in our belonging together,
our [embeddedness in tradition], in a community of reasoners . . .’’3 More
recently, however, Smith retrenches his claim in important respects by
suggesting that Gadamer’s hermeneutics does not provide a model for legal
argumentation, but rather a ‘‘challenge.’’4 The task for legal theory, Smith

1. See P. Christopher Smith, The Hermeneutics of Original Argument: Demonstration, Dialectic, Rhetoric
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998).
2. P. Christopher Smith, ‘‘The Uses of Aristotle in Gadamer’s Recovery of Consultative
Reasoning: Sunesis, Sungnômê, Epieikeia, and Sumbouleuesthai,’’ Chicago-Kent Law Review 76
(2000), p. 749.
3. Op. cit., pp. 749  50.
4. P. Christopher Smith, ‘‘From Strife to Understanding: Pathological Argument in Nietzsche
and Gadamer,’’ unpublished conference paper, p. 21, 2003 Annual Meeting of the Association
for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities, New York University. An earlier version of
Smith’s paper was published as P. Christopher Smith, ‘‘Nietzsche and Gadamer: From Strife
to Understanding, Achilles/Agamemnon to Achilles/Priam,’’ Continental Philosophical Review 35
(2002), p. 379, but the published version does not contain Smith’s application of his thesis to
legal hermeneutics. I am grateful to Chris for permitting me to quote from his unpublished
manuscript.
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argues, is ‘‘to acknowledge the inevitably contentious, derivative nature of
legal reasoning and, by establishing its boundaries, prevent its usurpation of
the entire ethical realm of conversational deliberation . . . Indeed, the way
must always be left open to recover the deliberative community from which
legal reasoning removed itself in the first place.’’5 Smith concludes that
Gadamer and Nietzsche both offer insights into understanding and
interpretation, but that Gadamer’s approach holds no real significance for
the demonstrative contest of legal argumentation. More pointedly, Smith
appears to argue that legal argumentation must be demystified by
Nietzschean critique and then cabined, given that legal argumentation
precludes genuine hermeneutical exchanges.
In response, I contend that contemporary legal practice need not be a
paradigm of modernity’s forgetfulness of original argumentation, even if it
too often plays this role. My thesis is that Nietzsche announced the
destruction of a certain understanding of legal argumentation but not the
destruction of law, and that the hermeneutical characteristics of legal
practice have not been occluded irreversibly by the ascendency of technical
rationality and the clash of wills to power. Working from Smith’s creative
and stimulating insights, but against his conclusions, I pursue a hermeneutical defense of law and critical legal theory in response to Nietzsche’s
challenge.
This paper is organized in two parts. In the first part, I reclaim the
constructive elements of Heidegger’s Destruktion as an appropriate response
to Nietzsche’s seemingly uncompromising rejection of the potential for
philosophy in the face of will to power. Gadamer extends the guiding
concept of Destruktion by connecting it to the experience of dialogue,
focusing on life as it is lived rather than abstract philosophical concepts.
I return to the 1981 encounter between Gadamer and Derrida and
argue that Gadamer effectively answered Derrida’s Nietzschean reading
of Heidegger, as evidenced in the reverberations of this debate in
their subsequent writings. I conclude that Gadamer’s elaboration of
Heideggerian Destruktion, particularly in response to Derrida’s Nietzschean
critique, provides a viable response to Nietzsche’s unremitting critical
challenge.
In the second part, I bring Gadamer’s philosophy to bear on legal
practice and legal theory. Gadamer’s argument that dialogical risk in
conversation fuels Destruktion does not provide a methodology for correct
decision making, but it does clarify how legal practice might be facilitated by
acknowledging the nature of hermeneutical understanding and critical
insight. I conclude by demonstrating the power of this perspective to answer
Smith’s Nietzschean critique of law by working through Smith’s example of
the agonistic contest of family law litigation.

5. Smith, ‘‘Strife,’’ p. 21.
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II. Reclaiming Heidegger’s Legacy: Revisiting the
Gadamer-Derrida Encounter
A hermeneutical response to Nietzsche must begin with Heidegger, who
directly confronted the power of Nietzsche’s thought as part of his masterful
recasting of the philosophical tradition. Heidegger’s initial effort in Being and
Time to construct a fundamental ontology of the finitude of existence
collapsed of its own weight,6 leading to his ‘‘turn’’ away from the ‘‘language
of metaphysics.’’ In his later period, Heidegger waited upon the gods, who
speak through the ineffable language of poetry. Heidegger’s account of the
experience of truth reflects this development in his thought: evolving from
his early notion of truth as emerging from a tarrying with the disclosure of
meaning, to truth as the product of a momentary grasping (Augenblick), and
finally to truth experienced as a flash of insight that strikes like lightning
loosed by the gods.7 With his ‘‘turn,’’ in which truth is no longer a project
but only an event, Heidegger would appear to have encountered the deadend of Nietzsche’s relentless critical theory. This judgment is perhaps most
clearly supported by Heidegger’s intimation to family members shortly
before his death that Nietzsche had ‘‘ruined’’ him.8 One plausible
interpretation of this self-evaluation is that, in the end, Heidegger found
it impossible to philosophize while simultaneously remaining true to
Nietzsche’s radical dismantling of the philosophical enterprise.
Heidegger’s lament need not become a cause for resignation. His original
and provocative thinking has been carried forward in productive ways that
grapple with Nietzsche’s legacy. Gadamer and Derrida represent two major
divisions of thought that follow Heidegger’s lead, with the resulting debate
(to paraphrase Paul Ricoeur) between hermeneutical dialogue (belonging)
and deconstructive wariness (suspicion). I endorse Gadamer’s claim that his
‘‘philosophical hermeneutics’’ pursues Heidegger’s ‘‘turn’’ away from
fundamental ontology in a productive, even if surprising, way. Gadamer
brings life to Heidegger’s turn by ‘‘re-turning’’ to Heidegger’s early pathbreaking interpretations of Aristotle’s philosophy of factical life, interpretations that had jolted the student Gadamer like ‘‘an electric shock.’’9 If
6. Gadamer succinctly explains this collapse as Heidegger’s recognition that he had not made a
complete breakthrough in his challenge to the idealism of consciousness. ‘‘For what he called
the ‘fundamental ontology of Dasein’ could not  despite all the temporal analyses of how
Dasein is constituted as Sorge [‘‘care’’]  overcome its own self-reference and hence a
fundamental positing of self-consciousness. For this reason, fundamental ontology was not able
fully to break away from immanent consciousness of the Husserlian type.’’ Hans-Georg
Gadamer, ‘‘Destruktion and Deconstruction,’’ in Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard Palmer, eds.,
Dialogue and Deconstruction : The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1989), p. 104 (Geoff Waite and Richard Palmer, trans.).
7. Robert J. Dostal, ‘‘Gadamer’s Relation to Heidegger and Phenomenology,’’ in Robert J.
Dostal, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2002), p. 247.
8. Op. cit., p. 261 (quoting from an interview with Gadamer, ‘‘Heidegger und Nietzsche:
Nietzsche hat mich kaputtgemacht!,’’ Aletheia 5 (1994), pp. 6  8.
9. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships (Boston, MA: The MIT Press, 1985), pp.
46  47 (Robert R. Sullivan, trans.).
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Heidegger, in the end, awaited an unrequited conversation with the gods,
Gadamer ‘‘re-turns’’ to Heidegger’s origins and finds in ordinary conversation the key to responding to Nietzsche’s initiatives.

2.1 Destruktion as Dialogic Encounter, not Poetic Event
Gadamer is surprisingly silent about Nietzsche,10 but he did grapple with
Nietzsche’s philosophy in his infamous (non )encounter with Derrida in
1981. After acknowledging that he and Derrida are both indebted to the
later Heidegger, Gadamer used his introductory comments to recount
important differences in their developments of Heidegger’s insights. Against
Derrida’s deconstructive criticism of Heidegger for remaining in the grip of
the language of metaphysics and failing to embrace the depth of Nietzsche’s
critique, Gadamer insists that Heidegger was ‘‘not exhausted in a mere
gesture of protest, as was the case with . . . Nietzsche. Rather, he attacked his
task as being a matter of hard conceptual labor, which one should learn
from the study of Aristotle.’’11
Heidegger’s early Aristotle lectures pursued Destruktion of the philosophical tradition, and Gadamer insists that with his ‘‘turn’’ Heidegger ‘‘actually
held to his fundamental project by maintaining, in a sublimated form, the
destruktive achievement present in its beginnings.’’12 Gadamer joins Hannah
Arendt and others who find in the early Heidegger the key to understanding
his later philosophical initiatives.13 Gadamer argues that Heidegger’s early
Aristotle studies provide models of Destruktion, in which he abandons the
philosophical pretensions problematized by Nietzsche without abandoning
philosophical critique altogether.
Anticipating Gadamer’s notion of ‘‘fusion of horizons,’’ Heidegger wrote
regarding the destruction of Aristotle and the tradition based on him,

10. Elsewhere I have argued in detail that reading Gadamer and Nietzsche together as challenging
supplements to each other is not only possible, but productive. Francis J. Mootz III,
‘‘Nietzschean Critique and Philosophical Hermeneutics,’’ Cardozo Law Review 24 (2003),
p. 967.
11. Gadamer, ‘‘Destruktion ,’’ p. 110.
12. Op. cit., p. 109.
13. See John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1994). Ironically, Heidegger’s autobiographical tendency to dismiss his early
work as having been superceded by his ‘‘turn’’ served to undermine his themes of flux and
plurality and contributed to the scholastic development of ‘‘Heidegger, Inc.’’ Op. cit.,
pp. 21  23. Summarizing the ambivalence in Heidegger’s self-assessment, van Buren writes:
In his autobiographies, the right hand does not appear to know what the left hand is doing.
On the one hand, he indicated that his enduring topic was discovered in his youthful
thoughtpaths, and that this topic is characterized by a radical openness and diversity of
byways, incomplete ways, and errant ways. On the other hand, he downplayed and often
even dismissed his youthful thought, placing it into a hierarchical-teleological relationship to
‘‘the way’’ of his subsequent writings.
Op. cit., p. 9.
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‘‘Corresponding to our position, the original position is to be again
worked out anew, i.e., corresponding to our altered historical situation, it
is something other and yet the same.’’ The ‘‘effective possibility’’ of
Aristotle’s thought ‘‘for its future’’ was to be sprung loose through
‘‘repetition,’’ in which it kairologically and ‘‘constantly becomes a new
present.’’ The young Heidegger, Gadamer reported, was an ‘‘Aristotle
redivivus.’’14
Heidegger’s creative repetition of Aristotle’s ‘‘hermeneutics of facticity’’ not
only animates Heidegger’s later work, it fueled Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics.
Heidegger uses the word Destruktion to mean ‘‘dismantling and
reviving,’’ rather than ‘‘obliterating and moving past.’’ The purpose of
Destruktion ‘‘is to take concepts that have become rigid and lifeless and fill
them again with meaning. Such an activity does not serve the purpose of
pointing back to a mysterious origin, an arche´, or the like. That is a fatal
misunderstanding, which gets used as an objection above all against the
later Heidegger.’’15 Gadamer insists that Heidegger’s philosophical

14. Op. cit., p. 226 (quoting from the author’s translations of the German texts of the following
books: Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2001) (Richard Rojcewicz, trans.); Martin Heidegger, Ontology: Hermeneutics of
Facticity (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999) (John van Buren, trans.); and HansGeorg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, NY: Crossroad Publishing, 2nd rev. ed., 1989)
(Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, rev. trans.).
15. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘‘Letter to Dallmayr,’’ in Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard Palmer, eds.,
Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1989), p. 99 (Richard Palmer and Diane Michelfelder, trans.). Later, Gadamer
offers a similar definition, explaining that in Destruktion the goal ‘‘is to let [an encrusted
concept] speak again in its interwovenness in living language. This is a hermeneutical task. It
has nothing to do with obscure talk of origins and the original.’’ Op. cit., p. 100. Heidegger
provides a succinct account of the role of Destruktion in the Introduction to Being
and Time :
If the question of being is to achieve clarity regarding its own history, a loosening of the
sclerotic tradition and a dissolving of the concealments produced by it is necessary. We
understand this task as the [Destruktion ] of the traditional content of ancient ontology which
is to be carried out along the guidelines of the question of being. This [Destruktion ] is based upon
the original experiences in which the first and subsequently guiding determinations of being
were gained.
This demonstration of the provenance of the fundamental ontological concepts, as the
investigation which displays their ‘‘birth certificate,’’ has nothing to do with a pernicious
relativizing of ontological standpoints. The [Destruktion ] has just as little the negative sense of
disburdening ourselves of the ontological tradition. On the contrary, it should stake out the
positive possibilities of the tradition, and that always means to fix its boundaries . . . the
[Destruktion ] does not wish to bury the past in nullity; it has a positive intent. Its negative
function remains tacit and indirect.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996),
p. 20 [§6] (Joan Stambaugh trans., 7th German ed., 1953).
Heidegger’s famous promissory note for Part II described his intent to outline the basic
features ‘‘of a phenomenological [Destruktion ] of the history of ontology on the guideline of the
problem of temporality.’’ Op. cit., p. 35 [§8]. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics offers
payment on this promise by carrying forward the project of Destruktion while still avoiding the
metaphysical entanglements that Heidegger came to recognize in the first part.
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practice of Destruktion is a creative activity that creates a future through a
de-structuring repetition of the situation. Destruktion occurs within an
ongoing philosophical conversation; it is not achieved by ‘‘freeing’’
ourselves from metaphysics by casting it aside as if it were an historical
artifact.16 In other words, it is an empty gesture to reject the language of
metaphysics rather than to work through this heritage by means of a
Destruktion.
Gadamer revives early Heideggerian Destruktion against Heidegger’s
later claims to deconstruct the ‘‘language of metaphysics,’’ arguing that
Heidegger’s embrace of Nietzschean excess temporarily  but never
completely  derailed his initiatives.17 Gadamer’s contribution is to locate
the Destruktion of stale concepts within the de-centering experience of
dialogue rather than in the solitary efforts of the great philosopher,
advancing Heidegger’s early initiatives by taking ‘‘the path from dialectic
back to dialogue, back to conversation.’’18 Gadamer readily admits that
Heidegger was disappointed by Gadamer’s philosophical direction, and
that he considered Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy to be insufficiently radical. But Gadamer insists that his return to the practical
engagement of dialogue uncovers the key to undermining the ‘‘subjectivity
of the subject’’ by disrupting the assumption ‘‘that the subject takes hold
of empirical reality with methodological self-certainty by means of its
rational mathematical construction, and that it then expresses this reality
in propositional statements.’’19 Gadamer concludes that his contribution to
post-Heideggerian philosophy
is the discovery that no conceptual language, not even what Heidegger
called the ‘language of metaphysics,’ represents an unbreakable constraint upon thought if only the thinker allows himself to trust language;
that is, if he engages in dialogue with other thinkers and other ways of
thinking. Thus, in full accord with Heidegger’s critique of the concept of

16. Gadamer argues that Destruktion represents a feature of an unending tradition of philosophical
thinking, and so even Plato’s dialogues provide resources and are not just a metaphysical
straight-jacket against which Nietzsche and Heidegger rightfully struggled. Gadamer,
‘‘Dallmayr,’’ p. 101.
17. Gadamer argues that Heidegger’s mistaken efforts to follow Nietzsche’s most extreme paths in
an attempt to break free of the language of metaphysics led to ‘‘Holzwege , the kind of circuitous
dead-ends cut by loggers on wooded hillsides. And these paths, after the kehre, or turn of the
way of Heidegger’s thinking toward Being, led into impassable regions [and] remained an
adventurous journey into error.’’ Gadamer, ‘‘Destruktion ,’’ p. 104.
18. Op. cit., p. 109.
19. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘‘Text and Interpretation,’’ in Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard
Palmer, eds., Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1989), p. 26, 29 (Dennis J. Schmidt and Richard Palmer, trans.).
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subject, whose hidden ground he revealed as substance, I tried to
conceive the original phenomenon of language in dialogue.20
Too respectful of Heidegger’s pathbreaking work to say it directly, Gadamer
develops philosophical hermeneutics as a means of realizing Heidegger’s
ambition to confront Nietzsche without getting lost in the later Heidegger’s
elitist and poetic monologue.21
Gadamer places great importance on Heidegger’s work for showing that
Destruktion occurs not just as a product of genuine dialogue between two
persons, but also in a dialogic confrontation with tradition. In both cases,
truth is not experienced as a flash of insight, but rather emerges from a
tarrying and attentiveness to a challenging disclosure that takes time and
requires the relinquishment of subjective designs. This engagement is
revealed in the colloquial expression, ‘‘falling into a conversation,’’ which
signals that a conversation is more than the goal-oriented strategies of its
participants, and that it develops over time rather than being accomplished
instantly. Gadamer’s focus on dialogue leads him to conclude that there
simply is no mistaken ‘‘language of metaphysics’’ that we can identify from
afar and then abandon once and for all through deconstructive thinking that
purports to be radically Nietzschean.
There is only a metaphysically thought-out coinage of concepts that have
been lifted from living speech. Such coinage of concepts can, as in the
case of Aristotelian logic and ontology, establish a fixed conceptual
tradition and consequently lead to an alienation from the living
language. . . . Thus, the task of a Destruktion of the conceptuality of
metaphysics was posed. This is the only tenable sense of talk about the
‘‘language of metaphysics’’: this phrase simply refers to the conceptuality
that has been built up in the history of metaphysics.
Early on, Heidegger was to put forward as a rallying cry the task of a
Destruktion of the alienated conceptuality of metaphysics: the ongoing task
of contemporary thinking. With unbelievable freshness, he was able to
trace in thinking the concepts of the tradition back to the Greek
language, back to the [now forgotten] natural sense of words and the
hidden wisdom of language they contain, and in so doing, to give new life

20. Op. cit., p. 23.
21. In an essay on Hegel’s continuing relevance to contemporary philosophical dialogue,
Gadamer most clearly makes the case that he is continuing Heidegger’s later initiatives
precisely by returning to dialogue. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘‘The Heritage of Hegel,’’ in Reason
in the Age of Science (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981), pp. 56  58 (Frederick G.
Lawrence, trans.). Suspicious of Heidegger’s turn away from everyday dialogue, Gadamer
finds the key to Destruktion in the challenge to subjectivity that comes from dialogue, and he
rejects the claimed expertise of the profound thinker who is able to gain access to an event that
is invisible to most persons.
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to Greek thought and its power to address us today. Such was
Heidegger’s genius. He had a penchant for restoring to words their
hidden, no longer intended sense, and then from this so-called etymology
to draw fundamental consequences for thinking.22
Hermeneutical retrieval of philosophical concepts is a Destruktion that opens
the potential for breaking the grip of stale conceptualism and undermining
the pervasive subjectivism that is the legacy of this calcified tradition.
Gadamer’s signature insight that ‘‘we understand in a different way, if we
understand at all,’’ emphasizes the dynamic effects of dialogic understanding.23
Gadamer’s retrieval of Heideggerian Destruktion responds to Nietzsche’s
challenge by returning to dialogue and factical life. In this manner,
Gadamer avoids the increasingly insular and enigmatic qualities of the
later Heidegger without relapsing to the abandoned project of devising a
fundamental ontology. In essence, Gadamer is arguing that Nietzsche’s
philosophical challenge to modernist subjectivity is realized in the decentering experience of dialogue, a broad term that Gadamer uses to
characterize hermeneutical experience. Gadamer argues that a variety of
experiences  engaging a work of art, participating in a genuine
conversation, and even rendering a legal judgment  exemplify the kind
of de-centering experiences that Nietzsche seeks to promote with his
disruptive interrogations of received wisdom. Of course, Gadamer does not
suggest that a quick walk through a museum, casual chit-chat, or the
bureaucratic practices of traffic court inevitably promote a Nietzschean
Destruktion of the metaphysical tradition. His point is that these practices and
experiences simultaneously reveal and conceal the de-centering of subjectivity anticipated by Nietzsche. By working through these practices and
experiences and recuperating their dialogic character, Gadamer suggests,
we can live Nietzsche’s critique rather than just study it.

2.2 Confronting Derrida’s Nietzschean Critique
of Heidegger
Gadamer used the occasion of his exchange with Derrida to show that the
dialogic conception of Destruktion that he developed by reading Heidegger’s
‘‘turn’’ through the lens of Heidegger’s early work provides an intriguing

22. Gadamer, ‘‘Destruktion ,’’ p. 107. Put succinctly, Heidegger’s project claimed that Aristotelian
conceptual analysis had been lost in translation  first into Latin and then into modern
language  thereby literally rendering ‘‘Aristotle’s commentary speechless.’’ Gadamer,
‘‘Dallmayr,’’ p. 99. Gadamer’s point is that ‘‘this alienation confronts us with a task: the task of
Destruktion .’’ Op. cit.
23. Gadamer, Truth and Method , p. 297 (emphasis in original).
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response to the Nietzschean challenge. In the course of describing his
response to Nietzsche, Gadamer attempted to give full recognition to
Derrida’s Nietzschean rebuttal:
Now Derrida will certainly object that I do not take Nietzsche seriously
enough: that is to say, the end of metaphysics, that break which, since
Nietzsche, makes all identity and continuity with oneself and with the
other illusory. He takes these to be logocentric illusions from which even
Heidegger did not escape, as [Heidegger’s] Nietzsche-interpretation
shows.24
Gadamer insists that human finitude precludes attaining a ‘‘complete’’ or
‘‘timeless’’ understanding, but he acknowledges Derrida’s persistent challenge that he still has conceded too much ‘‘to reciprocal understanding and
mutual agreement’’ in the face of irreducible difference, and that his
celebration of dialogue betrays an implicit assumption that we truly can
come to know another, whether the other is a person, idea, or culture.25
Gadamer responds that Derrida’s efforts to move beyond Destruktion and to
escape the grip of metaphysics through deconstruction is a hopeless dream,
one that builds on Heidegger’s failures in his response to Nietzsche, rather
than on Heidegger’s earlier innovations.
Unfortunately, Derrida did not engage Gadamer directly on these issues
during their exchange. It should not be surprising that Gadamer, the
sensitive and responsive hermeneutic critic, attempted to anticipate and
fairly articulate Derrida’s challenges to his approach. But it was surprising to
many that Derrida’s response to Gadamer’s detailed effort to take account
of convergences and departures in philosophical hermeneutics and
deconstruction came in the form of ‘‘three questions’’ that appeared to be
wholly non-responsive.26 For example, in response to Gadamer’s emphasis
on the interpreter’s willingness to allow a text to speak rather than
subordinating the text to the interpreter’s designs, Derrida questions
whether hermeneutical ‘‘good will’’ merely re-instantiates the Kantian
metaphysics of will.27 In Derrida’s principal paper, he elliptically
mused about the difficulty of ascribing positions to Nietzsche and

24. Gadamer, ‘‘Dallmayr,’’ p. 96.
25. Gadamer, ‘‘Dallmayr,’’ p. 97.
26. Gadamer’s reply to Derrida’s brief questions begins by making clear his puzzlement: ‘‘Mr.
Derrida’s questions prove irrefutably that my remarks on text and interpretation, to the extent
they had Derrida’s well-known position in mind, did not accomplish their objective. I am
finding it difficult to understand these questions that have been addressed to me.’’ Hans-Georg
Gadamer, ‘‘Reply to Jacques Derrida,’’ in Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard Palmer, trans. and
eds., Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer  Derrida Encounter (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1989), p. 55.
27. Jacques Derrida, ‘‘Three Questions for Hans-Georg Gadamer,’’ in Diane P. Michelfelder &
Richard Palmer trans. and eds., Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer  Derrida Encounter
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 52  53.
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Heidegger, thereby effectively refusing to engage Gadamer directly on their
different interpretations of Heidegger’s confrontation with Nietzsche’s
thought.
In the space created by Derrida’s silence, some of Derrida’s followers
joined the debate and argued that Gadamer’s exegetical optimism reflects a
misunderstanding of the Nietzschean challenge with which Heidegger
grappled and which gives rise to Derrida’s deconstruction. John Caputo
characterizes Gadamer’s hermeneutical reading of Heideggerian Destruktion
as ‘‘half-hearted, indeed reactionary, even resistant to the momentum, the
direction, the tendency of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics.’’28 Advancing a ‘‘radical hermeneutics,’’ Caputo argues that Gadamer missed the
radicalism of Heidegger’s Kehre and that Derrida has surpassed Heidegger’s
initiatives.29 For Caputo, Derrida’s mysterious approach to the debate
demonstrates that there ‘‘is a more Nietzschean side to Derrida than in
Heidegger or Gadamer, a more deeply suspicious eye, a greater sense of the
fragility of our thought constructions and the contingency of our institutions.’’30 In a later book Caputo treats Gadamer with a gentler hand, but he
continues to indict philosophical hermeneutics for failing to address
Nietzsche’s radicalism.31 Caputo’s Derridean critique of Gadamer exemplifies the received wisdom among self-proclaimed radical theorists:
Gadamer’s Destruktive return to dialogue remains trapped within the
metaphysics of presence.
Gadamer’s commentators responded in kind, criticizing Derrida for
failing to risk his ideas in dialogue with Gadamer. Neal Oxenhandler alleges
that Derrida chose to subject Gadamer to ‘‘the cutting edge of irony’’ rather
than entering a dialogue with him, despite the considerable overlap in the
motivation and implications of their work.32 In more accusatory tones,
G.B. Madison suggests that Derrida would risk ‘‘alienating that specialized
audience which is composed of the addressees of his particular brand of
ultra-ironic discourse’’ if he dialogically engaged Gadamer on the problem
of power within hermeneutic understanding, concluding: ‘‘How else are we
to make sense of what in Derrida’s response to Gadamer (and in remarks of
his elsewhere) is manifest nonsense, a caricaturial misreading of Gadamer

28. John D. Caputo, ‘‘Gadamer’s Closet Essentialism: A Derridean Critique,’’ in Diane P.
Michelfelder & Richard Palmer, eds., Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer  Derrida Encounter
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 261.
29. John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 95  119.
30. Op. cit., p. 97.
31. John D. Caputo, More Radical Hermeneutics: On Not Knowing Who We Are (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 8, 41  59.
32. Neal Oxenhandler, ‘‘The Man with Shoes of Wind: The Derrida  Gadamer Encounter,’’ in
Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard Palmer, eds., Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer  Derrida
Encounter (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 265.
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and hermeneutics? Can it be anything other than a calculated and
deliberate misunderstanding?’’33 Similarly, Donald Marshall suggests that
to ‘‘read so feeble a ‘response’ from the most distinguished
French philosopher since Sartre is certainly embarrassing and can be
explained only on the assumption that Derrida knows little or nothing of
Gadamer’s work and was too preoccupied with what he intended to say in
his own lecture on this occasion to give much attention to Gadamer’s
remarks.’’34
The perceived incommensurable interpretations of Nietzsche by Gadamer and Derrida is an enduring legacy of the commentary on the 1981
encounter, but the standoff is overly dramatized. Caputo’s endorsement of
Derridean deconstruction does not fall victim to simplistic readings of
Derrida’s radically Nietzschean perspective by abandoning reasoning to
chaotic flux. Instead, he reaffirms that he is ‘‘trying to restore the difficulty in
life, not to make it impossible,’’ which is to say that he regards deconstruction
as problematizing congealed forms of understanding, rather than precluding
understanding altogether.35 Having misread Gadamer for polemical reasons,
Caputo fails to recognize that deconstructive interventions challenging all
claims of necessity, universality, and timelessness without precluding ongoing
debates about which understandings better serve social needs in present
circumstances are the very hallmarks of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer’s emphasis on dialogue provides a non-subjectivist means
of breaking the grip of subjectivism that provides a more promising response
to Nietzsche than Caputo’s polemical account of Derrida’s deconstruction.
Caputo is not wholly to blame, inasmuch as Derrida’s refusal in 1981 to
engage an actual ‘‘other’’ in a dialogue that would risk his self-understanding
and prejudices was rather remarkable in light of his longstanding attention to
‘‘the Other.’’ Derrida’s undeniable dexterity in reading texts  literary,
philosophical, poetic, legal  was exhibited in a tour de force of exegetical
originality rather than devoted to a dialogic exchange with another thinker.
This is the most dramatic and telling lesson of his 1981 meeting with
Gadamer: Derrida literally was unable to hear and respond to another
thinker, even one with whom he shared substantial common ground and
who was approaching him in an earnest attempt to identify helpful points of
departure for discussion.
Gadamer’s supporters have too often attempted to freeze the debate in its
unproductive 1981 posture rather than pursuing its developing legacy,
thereby violating a fundamental tenet of philosophical hermeneutics.
Oxenhandler reports that Derrida conceded in a private conversation
that ‘‘nothing really happened’’ at the Paris encounter because developing
33. G.B. Madison, ‘‘Gadamer/Derrida: The Hermeneutics of Irony and Power,’’ in Diane P.
Michelfelder & Richard Palmer, eds., Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer  Derrida Encounter
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989) pp. 198, 194.
34. Donald G. Marshall, ‘‘Dialogue and E´criture ,’’ in Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard Palmer,
eds., Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer  Derrida Encounter (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1989), p. 206.
35. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics , p. 209.
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a ‘‘position in response to Gadamer . . . would take a great effort and that is
not what I want to do now.’’36 Pejoratively characterizing Derrida as a
disseminating prophet who necessarily is ‘‘exclusionary’’ in that he has
‘‘many acolytes but no equals,’’ Oxenhandler concludes that ‘‘the time will
come when Derrida will assume the responsibility of developing ‘a position
in response to Gadamer’ . . . ’’ and that it will prove to be productive.37
Madison also concedes that if Derrida ever took this risk, ‘‘a genuine and
lively dialogue would surely ensue,’’38 a project that regrettably is now left to
their commentators in light of the recent deaths of both philosophers.
Rather than focusing on the personalities involved in the highly charged
event, commentators should seek openings for a fresh reading of the debate.
Gadamer’s philosophy poses important questions that remain unanswered
by those who promote a deconstructive reading of Nietzsche’s critique. Can
the role of deconstructive prophet (whether the later Heidegger or Derrida)
facilitate Destruktion, or does this posture inevitably reinforce the grip of
subjectivist metaphysics even as it strives to become ever more radical? Is
Nietzsche’s challenge a call to philosophical radicalism, or is Nietzsche best
interpreted as issuing a call to live life without hiding behind philosophical
walls of any kind? In the end, isn’t it only putting oneself at risk in dialogue
that can facilitate the Destruktion of metaphysics, which is the experience of
being brought up short by one’s engagement with an actual other, rather
than the product of philosophical lessons about ‘‘the Other?’’ Doesn’t
Gadamer’s dialogic risk embody the Nietzschean critical spirit  the
dangerous maybe  in ways that the efforts by Heidegger and Derrida
do not?
Following the Paris encounter, Derrida’s work undoubtedly closed the gap
that Gadamer identified between their positions. This movement is perhaps
most starkly illustrated by Derrida’s surprising conference address, ‘‘Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,’’ which he begins by noting that it
would be easy to refuse to see any connection between deconstruction and
justice, but that such a posture would reveal the speaker to be not only ‘‘in a
bad temper,’’ but also ‘‘in bad faith.’’39 Derrida does not explain this
seeming reversal of his critique of Gadamerian hermeneutic charity, but the

36. Oxenhandler, ‘‘Shoes of Wind,’’ p. 268 (quoting a private conversation with Jacques Derrida
at Hanover, NH on 8 July 1987).
37. Op. cit., p. 268.
38. Madison, ‘‘Gadamer/Derrida,’’ p. 198.
39. Jacques Derrida, ‘‘Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’,’’ Cardozo Law Review
11 (Mary Quaintance, trans., 1990), p. 921. Derrida dramatically announced that
deconstruction has always been concerned with justice, and stated his intention ‘‘to show
why and how what is now called Deconstruction, while seeming not to ‘address’ the problem
of justice, has done nothing but address it, if only obliquely, unable to do so directly.’’ Op. cit.,
p. 935. Derrida’s reflections on law are quite congenial to Gadamer’s argument that law
exemplifies the hermeneutical situation. Derrida’s address was substantially enlarged in 1994
and the complete version first appeared in translation to English in Jacques Derrida, Acts of
Religion (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002) pp. 230  98 (Gil Anidjar, ed. and rev. trans.).
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gesture appears to be intentional. He characterizes the conference title as
requesting a violent ‘‘either/or,’’ in the form of a polemic, to which he
attempts to respond with an attitude of (what he apparently would call)
good faith.40 Similarly, Derrida, in his homage to Emmanuel Levinas, asks
whether ‘‘without exonerating myself in the least, decision and responsibility
are always of the other,’’ and ‘‘whether the ethics of hospitality that we will try
to analyze in Levinas’s thought would be able to found a law and a politics,
beyond the familial dwelling, within a society, nation, State, or NationState,’’ even if the hope of deducing such a politics is without warrant.41 In
these and other developments of his thought, Derrida might very well have
provided a basis for a dialogue with Gadamer that was not present in
1981.42
I do not wish to argue that Gadamer convincingly ‘‘won’’ their debate
such that no additional dialogue is necessary. Rather, I argue only that
following the path Gadamer blazed in response to the posture of
deconstruction in 1981 remains a productive path for responding to
Nietzsche’s challenge that is not as starkly opposed to Derrida’s important
initiatives as the commentators have supposed.43 Gadamer’s insistence that

40. Op. cit., p. 923.
41. Jacques Derrida, Adieu: To Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999),
pp. 23, 20 (Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael Naas, trans.). See also Jacques Derrida, Spectres of
Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International (New York, NY:
Routledge, 1994) (Peggy Kamuf, trans.); Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship (New York, NY:
Verso Press, 1997) (George Collins, trans.).
42. Caputo admits that ‘‘insofar as Derrida, very much under Levinas’s influence, has come to
regard faith as the medium in which we communicate  as soon as I open my mouth, I try to
speak the truth  his work has come closer to Gadamer than to Heidegger.’’ Caputo, More
Radical Hermeneutics , p. 42.
43. Jean Grondin concludes his biography of Gadamer by quoting Derrida’s published reaction to
the news of Gadamer’s death in 2002: ‘‘how right he was, then [in 1981] and still today!’’ Jean
Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biography (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003),
p. 338 (Joel Weinsheimer, trans.) (quoting Jacques Derrida, ‘‘Wie recht er hatte! Mein Cicerone
Hans-Georg Gadamer,’’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (28 March, 2002)). In an interview near
the end of his life, Gadamer claimed that Derrida later understood that his allegation of
‘‘logocentrism’’ was a ‘‘gross misunderstanding’’ of Gadamer’s position, and that ‘‘in the
meantime, Derrida and I became quite well attuned to one another . . . Since then he has been
entirely on my side.’’ A Century of Philosophy: Hans-Georg Gadamer in Conversation with Riccardo
Dottori (New York, NY, Continuum, 2004), pp. 60  61 (Rod Coltman with Sigrid Koepke,
trans.).
It is my natural lawyering instinct to quote these ‘‘party admissions’’ prominently in my
text as conclusive proof of my thesis, but to do so would surely undermine my thesis. Gadamer
and Derrida do not represent fixed interpretations of Nietzsche that collided in 1981, with one
to emerge finally as a ‘‘victor.’’ Rather, their dialogue itself became the test case for their
interpretations, and Derrida’s gracious comments can perhaps best be interpreted as an
agreement that Gadamer’s invitation to converse would have been a more productive, more
provocative, more piercing experience. In this sense, Gadamer was a cicerone, or guide, for
Derrida. But it is Gadamer’s insights that prevent me from declaring an easy ‘‘victory’’ over
Derrida, and lead me instead to call for a more probing engagement of Nietzsche in light of
the dynamic challenge of Derrida’s deconstruction. Gadamer’s indication that they later both
recognized the commonality between their approaches is offered in the spirit of dynamic
hermeneutical understanding, as revealed by his concluding observation on the 1981
encounter: ‘‘The horizon of interpretation changes constantly, just as our visual horizon also
varies with every step that we take.’’ Op. cit.
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conversational dialogue breaks the gripping prejudice of insular subjectivity,
and the connection between this experience and the philosophical project of
Destruktion in which one critically engages with tradition, provide a
compelling orientation for critical legal thinking. Gadamer’s elaboration
of Heidegger’s Destruktion opens a path between unthinking conventionalism
and unceasing challenge, but his philosophy remains notoriously silent
about how we can facilitate the work of ordinary dialogue to overcome
‘‘unproductive prejudices.’’ Rather than asking how a challenging Destruktion of law becomes possible, he asks whether modernity’s prejudices can
completely silence the Destruktion of legal practice. As with Derrida,
Gadamer’s later work appeared to take more account of his opponent’s
insights,44 but nevertheless the role of critical legal theory remained woefully
underdeveloped. Having argued that Gadamer responds to Nietzsche to the
extent that he avoids the problems encountered by Heidegger and Derrida,
I now develop Gadamer’s response to the Nietzschean challenge in its own
right by returning to Smith’s critique.

III. Destruktion, Law and Critical Legal Theory
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics does not translate to the setting of
legal practice and theory in an obvious manner. What do legal theorists
gain, even if I am correct that Gadamer has effectively responded to
Nietzsche’s philosophical challenge? Can Gadamer’s emphasis on dialogic
risk in conversation, which serves as the engine of Destruktion, shed light on
the role and prospects for critical legal theory? The answer to these
questions is not a matter of specifying what Gadamer’s philosophy can teach
legal practitioners and legal theorists from the supposed heights of
philosophical insight. Gadamer does not provide a unique and determinant
methodology for engaging in legal practice or critical legal theory, and his
philosophy pointedly disclaims any such goal. Notwithstanding this
limitation, theorists can illuminate Gadamer’s themes by referring to legal
practice, and can also suggest how legal practice might be facilitated by an
explicit recognition of those themes. These seemingly modest accomplishments are more than sufficient to permit us to see beyond Nietzsche’s
shadow.

3.1 Philosophical Hermeneutics and Legal Practice
At a critical juncture of Truth and Method Gadamer turns to Aristotelian
practical philosophy to characterize the activity of interpretation, and he
suggests that legal practice provides an excellent model of this interpretive
practical engagement.45 Likewise, in his exchange with Derrida, Gadamer
44. I believe that Gadamer’s attention to multiculturalism in his later work reflects this recognition
of the significance of work by Derrida and others.
45. Gadamer, Truth and Method , pp. 324  41.
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turned to legal interpretation at a key point of his discussion of the
philosophical significance of textual interpretation.46 At first glance,
however, Gadamer’s characterizations of legal practice appear to be selfcontradictory, if not incoherent. After carefully reconstructing Gadamer’s
assessment of legal hermeneutics, I will explore how his philosophy
provides a model of critical legal theory that responds to Nietzsche’s
legacy.
Gadamer regards ‘‘reading and understanding’’ as the process of leading
the ‘‘announcement’’ of the text back to its ‘‘original authenticity,’’ by which
he means back to the communicative event from which the text now
appears as a residue.47 Due to the inevitability of textual distanciation,
drafting legal texts must be ‘‘especially exacting,’’ with the effort ‘‘always to
avoid strife, to exclude misunderstandings and misuse, and to make univocal
understanding possible.’’48 To the extent that this characterization suggests
that legal texts can be promulgated in a manner that permits a later
interpreter to creatively reconstitute the original directive as intended by the
text’s author, Gadamer appears to endorse the romantic conception of
hermeneutics that has always been one of his principal targets.49 Needless to
say, Gadamer’s invocation of a ‘‘univocal meaning’’ resonates with
conservative themes and appears to align him with metaphysical commitments to a knowing subject before whom the textual object of interpretation
can be rendered fully present.
A careful assessment of Gadamer’s discussion of legal hermeneutics,
however, disrupts any such romantic or conservative reading. References
to returning to the ‘‘original communicative event’’ and attempting to
express a ‘‘univocal meaning’’ do not signal Gadamer’s belief that legal
texts are capable of fixing a perspicacious meaning that can be recovered
intact and then applied. Gadamer begins with the longstanding
recognition that laws cannot be construed as simple directives that are
self-executing, but instead must always be read according to their general
sense. ‘‘Accordingly, we must say that a text is not simply a given object
but a phase in the execution of the communicative event [Verständigungsgeschehen].’’50 This means that a legal text always contains the ‘‘free space
of meaningful concretization, a concretization that has to carry out the
interpretation for the purpose of practical application.’’51 Legal texts do
not require interpretation only when they are vague, as a prelude to
their application to a particular problem; instead, understanding is

Gadamer, ‘‘Text and Interpretation,’’ pp. 35  36.
Op. cit., p. 35.
Op. cit., pp. 35  36.
In Truth and Method , Gadamer specifically relies on Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology
to avoid the pitfalls of Wilhelm Dilthey’s romantic hermeneutics. Gadamer, Truth and Method ,
pp. 218  64.
50. Gadamer, ‘‘Text and Interpretation,’’ p. 35.
51. Op. cit., p. 36.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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possible at all only in an interpretive application of the law to a case at
hand.52 Gadamer concludes that legal ‘‘decisions, precedents, or the
prevailing administration of the law therefore always have a creative legal
function’’ by applying the law to a set of facts.53
These seemingly contradictory themes, once properly understood,
underscore why Gadamer emphasizes that the concrete setting of legal
practice reveals the hermeneutical situation with ‘‘exemplary clarity,’’54 and
why the hermeneutical situation can accommodate Nietzschean critique.
Legal hermeneutics always involves the interpretation of binding texts, texts
that make a claim on the interpreter and to which the interpreter must
submit if she is to understand the law. This motivates the legal practitioner’s
claim that she can discover a univocal meaning: the rule of law requires that
the law is obeyed, and that the interpreter does not freely twist the law to
her subjective designs. An interpreter who objectifies and contorts a text for
his own purposes risks nothing and remains within the grip of a subjectcentered orientation that precludes genuine interpretive activity. The rule of
law depends on the interpreter’s good faith, which means that the
interpreter acts in accordance with the law and does not manipulate the
legal texts in a cynical, strategic, or ironic manner. Although this reality is
particularly evident in legal practice where a decision must be made in
accordance with law, it is true no less of ordinary conversational exchange
and of the activity of reading literature.
The experience of giving oneself over to the text does not mean that legal
texts are self-executing, such that the interpreter disappears and meaning
emerges solely from the circumscribed and fixed world of the text. Lacking
an insular, acontextual and autonomous meaning, texts acquire meaning
only through their application to a particular concern. Legal hermeneutics
exemplifies this lesson, inasmuch as attorneys and judges recognize that
legal texts have meaning only in the context of a particular case. Legal
practice reveals clearly that interpretation always involves application,
which is to say that meaning is always meaning for the interpreter, in
response to the questions posed by the interpreter. This ‘‘free play’’ through

52. In Truth and Method , Gadamer stresses that the fundamental problem of hermeneutics is
application, and that interpretation ‘‘is not an occasional, post facto supplement to
understanding; rather, understanding is always interpretation’’ that occurs in application.
Gadamer, Truth and Method , p. 307. He elaborates:
The work of interpretation is to concretize the law in each specific case  i.e. it is a work of
application . The creative supplementing of the law that is involved is a task reserved to the
judge, but he is subject to the law in the same way as is every other member of the
community. It is part of the ideal of the rule of law that the judge’s judgment does not
proceed from an arbitrary and unpredictable decision, but from a just weighing up of the
whole.
Op. cit., p. 329. Gadamer’s extended discussion of legal hermeneutics serves to reveal that ‘‘all
reading involves application, so that a person reading a text is himself part of the meaning he
apprehends.’’ Op. cit., p. 340.
53. Gadamer, Text and Interpretation , p. 36.
54. Op. cit.
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application does not collapse into a celebration of the unfettered subjective
manipulation of the text. As a law professor I constantly hear students
propose interpretations of legal texts that don’t make any sense and would
never be advanced by competent lawyers, despite the linguistic plausibility
of their analysis. Free play in the interpretation is never unbounded and
indiscriminate, even if these boundaries always are in flux and subject to
free play.
Gadamer’s point, then, is that legal interpretation shows in particularly
vivid ways that textual interpretation is conversational in structure no less
than a spoken exchange between two persons. Understanding is not the
product of a methodology that can be imposed on a text as if it were an
object; rather, it emerges from the dialogic risk of conversational engagement. Legal practice reinforces the historically-effected character of
interpretation, in which the interpreter’s horizon of pre-understanding
fuses with the text’s effective-history of reception and re-circulation within a
particular culture to generate a meaning within a context. Gadamer’s
conversational model of understanding accords with Nietzsche’s perspectivism and emphasis on rhetoric, but it also accommodates his genealogical
critique.55 Nietzsche’s critique emerges from within contemporary practices,
and he finds in tradition sufficient resources for overcoming the historical
contingencies that have solidified into dogma. Gadamer’s development of
Heideggerian Destruktion pursues similar goals. Gadamer places emphasis on
the legal tradition precisely because the everyday experience of lawyers
involves Destruktion, despite the irony that lawyers and judges attempt to
suppress the nature of their dynamic activity by describing it as ‘just
following the rules.’

3.2 Critical Legal Theory and Destruktion as a Practical
Engagement
Smith endorses Gadamer’s characterization of the hermeneutical situation,
and he acknowledges that Gadamer exposes a limitation in Nietzsche’s
account by revealing that genuine dialogue and consultation may lead to
understanding. Nietzsche’s unremitting critical posture renders him ‘‘unable
to conceive of any communicative experience except contention for
dominance,’’56 and thus he is blind to the communal experience of
understanding that Gadamer characterizes by the notion of a ‘‘fusion of
horizons.’’ Emphasizing the kinship that makes understanding possible,
Gadamer successfully avoids an overly-intellectualized account of interpretation by rejecting all manner of foundationalism and formalism.57

55. I have drawn the connections between Gadamer and Nietzsche in these ways in some detail in
Mootz, ‘‘Nietzschean Critique.’’
56. Smith, ‘‘Strife,’’ p. 19.
57. Op. cit., pp. 12  14.
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But Smith cautions that Gadamer has not responded to the full depth of
Nietzsche’s critique, which extends beyond rejecting the primacy of
foundational and logically formalistic reasoning. Smith argues
that Nietzsche exposes the radically corporeal root of will to power, and
that Gadamer exhibits a ‘‘residual intellectualism’’ by failing to acknowledge fully that understanding also is rooted in our corporeal
existence.58
Smith concludes that Gadamer’s advance over Nietzsche regarding the
possibility of understanding through conversation does not extend to
Gadamer’s account of law. Simply put, Gadamer errs by attempting to
translate the corporeal and affective experience of hermeneutical understanding that can occur between two people to the very different institutional
setting of legal practice. Even if it is possible for interpersonal understanding
to rise above a Nietzschean contest of wills, Smith insists that matters
addressed in the legal realm are subject only to the bureaucratic management
of an agonistic contest of wills. He then offers an intriguing illustration:
Obviously, where the will to power ruins any possibility of Zugehörigkeit,
where all sense of kinship and belonging together in an ethical
community is destroyed, the only thing standing between civility and
the collapse into Hobbes’s anarchic ‘‘pursuit of power after power,’’ is the
rule of law, the Rechtszustand or legal status. For example, when a
marriage degenerates into a Machtkampf, an agoˆn for power and property,
or when, for that matter, any partnership devolves into . . . irreconcilable
antagonism . . . , only regulation by a legal instance of authority can
prevent the domination and exploitation of one party by the other.59
Smith agrees that kinship leading to understanding is possible, but he regards
it as a rare and fragile achievement. Legal practice is just a means of dealing
with failures of kinship and breakdowns in a consultative being-with-another. In
response to hermeneutical impasse, legal practice vaguely acknowledges and
then seeks to buffer the Nietzschean side of our embodied, affective lives by
retreating behind formalistic and deductive shibboleths. When an organic
relationship such as a marriage dissolves in fact, the law can only step in and
provide neutral (which is to say, disembodied) procedures to divide the
material residues of the relationship so as to avoid an open enactment of
the ongoing conflict. The essence of legal practice is best understood as the
management of Nietzsche’s ‘‘contest of wills,’’ Smith concludes, rather than
Gadamer’s notion of friendship, deliberation and understanding.

58. Op. cit., p. 19.
59. Op. cit., p. 20.
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Smith’s Nietzschean critique of Gadamer’s hermeneutical account of
legal practice has undeniable power, and it echoes Derrida’s interrogation of
hermeneutics. Surely it is idealistic, if not naive, to suggest that legal practice
is a ‘‘conversation’’ oriented toward ‘‘understanding,’’ rather than recognizing that legal practice is a bureaucratically-managed exercise of power.60
Under my reading, though, Gadamer’s claim that legal practice exemplifies
hermeneutical understanding does not fall victim to such a simplistic view.
Legal practice is conversational in structure, which means that it is
structured as a playful movement of questioning and answering, but this
is not to say that legal practice unfolds as if two intimates are engaged in a
meaningful conversation. Law is structured conversationally even if it clearly
is not just a conversation. Gadamer’s response to Derrida establishes the
basis for demonstrating the significance of philosophical hermeneutics in
response to Smith’s Nietzschean critique.
Smith is correct to insist that there is a critical difference between
interpersonal conversation and textual interpretation, but this distinction
has always been an important feature of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Arguing
against Derrida’s deconstructive reversal that the distanciation of textual
interpretation reveals more about interpretative encounters than the
personal character of oral exchanges, Gadamer steadfastly insists (as does
Smith) that hermeneutical understanding is rooted in a (literal)
‘‘full-bodied’’ encounter with another.61 Nevertheless, Gadamer gives
textual interpretation its due in our modern literate culture. A principle
goal of his exchange with Derrida was to explore the extent to which
Derrida’s focus on textuality provides important guidance to modern
hermeneutical philosophy. Gadamer does not posit a fanciful account of law
as a conversation among friends seeking agreement in the agora. He
acknowledges that a new hermeneutical experience is called forth in
60. Sanford Levinson’s assessment of the law and literature movement twenty years ago included
what may be the best succinct articulation of this criticism.
Yet there are obvious difficulties in adopting Rorty’s metaphor of the conversation (rather
than the argument), for the principal social reality of law is its coercive force vis-à-vis those
who prefer to behave other than as the law ’requires.’ As Chairman Mao pointed out, a
revolution is not a tea party, and the massive disruption in lives that can be triggered by a
legal case is not a conversation. The legal system presents a conversation from which there
may be no exit, and there are certainly those who would define hell as the vision of their
least favorite constitutional interpreter, whether the Court or a benighted law professor.
Sanford Levinson, ‘‘Law as Literature,’’ Texas Law Review 60 (1982), p. 386. Septicism about
conversational models of law was famously voiced several years later by Robert Cover.
Speaking about the function of law in convicting and sentencing criminal defendants, Cover
writes:
. . . I do not wish us to pretend that we talk our prisoners into jail. The ‘interpretations’ or
‘conversations’ that are the preconditions for violent incarceration are themselves
implements of violence. To obscure this fact is precisely analogous to ignoring the
background screams or visible instruments of torture in an inquisitor’s interrogation. The
experience of the prisoner is, from the outset, an experience of being violently dominated,
and it is colored from the beginning by the fear of being violently treated.
Robert Cover, ‘‘Violence and the Word,’’ Yale Law Journal 95 (1986), p. 1608.
61. Smith, Original Argument , pp. 134  56.
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modernity by a text-based culture that facilitates increasingly complex forms
of social organization.
Smith’s elegant book, The Hermeneutics of Original Argument, provides a case
in point of this new hermeneutical situation. Drawing from multiple
resources in the Western canon, with a particular emphasis on Nietzsche
and Gadamer, Smith chronicles the abstraction from our affective life that
has accompanied the ascent of modern technical and logical models of
thinking that are removed from the aural nature of deliberating with
another person. In concluding his study, though, Smith acknowledges the
irony of having made the case for a hermeneutical retrieval of the aural
(corporeal) dimensions of original argument by means of a complex and
lengthy text that is produced and shipped off to anonymous readers.62
Smith concedes that his account unavoidably is demonstrative rather than
deliberative, and his demonstration of the ‘‘true’’ character of our corporeal
being-with-others occurs only by virtue of his disembodied, textual beingwith-readers. Gadamer’s emphasis on legal hermeneutics is important for
this very reason: he embraces this irony and investigates the hermeneutical
character of reality not only in the modern literate world, but also in the
emerging postmodern world of computerized data and text processing. I
would not hesitate to cite Smith’s book as an exemplary instance of inviting
hermeneutical understanding in the manner described by Gadamer and as
exemplified in legal practice.
Derrida took Heidegger’s Destruktion as the starting point for his
deconstruction, but Gadamer’s different development of Destruktion proves
its worth by responding to Nietzsche’s challenge by articulating the potential
for the creative and critical development of a textual tradition. This carries
forward Heidegger’s insight that Destruktion
of Western metaphysics does not destroy or even destructure metaphysics; on the contrary, it decomposes or decompiles metaphysics’
sedimented historical layers, reconstructing their hidden ontotheological
structure and seeking to uncover the ‘decisive experiences’ responsible for
this shared structure (experiences which Heidegger hopes will help us to
envision a path beyond ontotheology).63
Smith’s textual uncovering of the depth of Nietzsche’s challenge is an
example of this Destruktion in action. Although there can be no methodology
of Destruktion, there is a critical engagement with textual tradition that opens
pathways for more productive thinking by working through the inadequacies of that tradition.

62. Op. cit., p. 310.
63. Iain Thomson, ‘‘Ontotheology? Understanding Heidegger’s Destruktion of Metaphysics,’’
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2000), p. 323, n.2.
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Heidegger’s hope is that careful philosophical study of such roads not
taken might help us envision alternatives to our own metaphysical epoch of
‘enframing.’ This it might do not only negatively, by contesting the
necessity of the Nietzschean metaphysics underlying our increasingly
homogenized ‘age of technologically-leveled world-civilization,’ and
thereby clearing the conceptual space for understandings of Being other
than the metaphysics of the atomic age (now fulfilling itself in the almost
uncontested spread of the cybernetic paradigm), but also positively, by
recovering concrete (if fragmentary) historical examples of a nonmetaphysical understanding of Being, elements of which (such as the
temporal dynamism of Heraclitean physis and the active conception of
truth as a historical clearing inherent in Parmenidean ale¯theia) we might
draw on in order to elaborate heretofore unthought-of historical paths
leading beyond our own late-modern Nietzschean impasse. Here we touch
again upon the later Heidegger’s central philosophical project, the vision
behind his enigmatic call for ‘an other beginning,’ a beginning which he
always insisted could only emerge out of a renewed and sustained
hermeneutic altercation with the first beginnings of Western thought.64
To recover from the bad dream of modernity we need not rise above our
situation through the prowess of critical insight; instead, we must invite and
enact a Destruktion. Nietzsche’s genealogical critique and rhetorical philosophy anticipate this development, but it is through Gadamer’s dialogical
development of Heideggerian Destruktion that it becomes concrete.
The best means of illustrating the practical significance of Gadamer’s
development of Destruktion is to work through Smith’s contrast between the
hermeneutically-defined marital relationship and the clash of power-interests
that occurs in family court. At the outset, Smith errs by sharply distinguishing
the public realm of law from the private realm of familial relations.65 The
kinship of the marital relationship is not purely a hermeneutical encounter
between two persons. The relationship unavoidably is shaped and enabled
by law inasmuch as marriage is a legal term rather than a natural term. To be
married is to be recognized as such in the eyes of the law, and to see oneself
accordingly. It is the legal character of the marriage relationship that
motivates some gays and lesbians to seek such recognition of their life
partnership, and leads other gays and lesbians to eschew any such legal status
for their relationship. Marriage, for better or worse, has lived significance by
virtue of our legal framework and heritage; hermeneutical intimacy is
inextricably entwined with law.
64. Op. cit., pp. 319  20.
65. Debunking this distinction has been one of the lasting contributions of the critical legal studies
movement and has been particularly emphasized by feminist scholars. Examples include
Frances E. Olsen, ‘‘The Myth of State Intervention in the Family,’’ University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform 18 (1985), p. 835; Ruth Gavison, ‘‘Feminism and the Public/Private
Distinction,’’ Stanford Law Review 45 (1992), p. 1. See generally Duncan Kennedy, ‘‘The
Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,’’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review
130 (1982), p. 1349.
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In addition, marriage is shaped by more than the family law statutes that
define the legal significance of marriage. The general law of property,
contract and torts enables the civil, social and economic world in which life
partners realize their shared plans. This general structuring is now
supplemented by the vast regulatory reach of the modern administrative
state, which channels and facilitates the life plans of all couples in countless
ways. To be married is just to take up one’s life with another person in the
complex matrix that is significantly, although certainly not exclusively, shaped
by legal norms. Smith mistakenly regards the married couple as existing in a
pre-legal state, reducing the legal system to its dispute resolution function.
By way of reply to this general critique, Smith might join with Habermas
in concluding that the lifeworld of interpersonal relations has been
colonized by juridical imperatives,66 and then argue further that this
colonization is nothing less than the covering over of original argument by a
derivative manner of being-with-another as legal subjects. Habermas
presses this point against Gadamer with a vengeance, arguing that we
cannot reverse the colonization by technocratic rationality of the lifeworld
by introducing ‘‘conversational’’ capacities from the bygone era of the polis
at the level of system in the modern bureaucratic state.67 But this rejoinder
is likely to blunt the force of Nietzsche’s critique rather than to reinvigorate
it. Theorists tend to fall victim to one of two equally disabling orientations:
either they follow Habermas in positing a quasi-transcendental principle to
save the day, or they embrace a wistful and romantic desire to return to the
dialogic encounters of the agora. Gadamer chooses instead to recognize the
textuality of modernity, to identify the misunderstandings of understanding
that textuality has spawned, and to characterize the hermeneutical situation
by identifying legal practice as an exemplar of the activity of understanding
in textual culture.
Although there is no definitive separation between law and personal life,
certainly there is a valid and meaningful distinction that can be drawn
between the understanding fostered by marital intimacy and the understanding achieved in legal interpretation. Smith compares the family law
response to a failed marriage to the kinship of a healthy marriage in
concluding that law does not recuperate the hermeneutics of original
66. See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 94  99 (William Rehg, trans.)
(describing the breakdown of natural law paradigms and the modern necessity of justification
of social organization through legal principles of human rights and sovereignty). For extended
discussions of these themes, see Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and
the Rationalization of Society I (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984), pp. 243  71 (Thomas
McCarthy, trans.) (discussing Max Weber’s analysis of the rationalizing role performed by law
in the wake of the demythologization of religious and metaphysical worldviews) and Jürgen
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System, A Critique of Functionalist Reason
II (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1989), pp. 356  73 (Thomas McCarthy, trans.) (analyzing the
juridification of family relations and educational relationships as an instance of the
colonization of the lifeworld by instrumental reason and the supplanting of communicative
reason).
67. Habermas rejects the hermeneutic account of modern legal systems in Habermas, Between Facts
and Norms , pp. 199  200.
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argument. However, his distinction works only by confusing the level at
which law operates in a conversational manner. No competent lawyer or
judge would suggest that the purpose of family law is to rekindle the failed
relationship, but the marital relationship is not the only community served
by law.68 The failure of a marriage reverberates throughout the social fabric,
and this personal strife risks introducing violence and recrimination into this
broader community. Family law is just an assertion of communal values to
shape the manner in which the effects of the failed marriage are felt by the
couple, their children, and the wider community in which they will continue
to live.
The division of the marital property undeniably can be a contest of wills
in the sense that each spouse’s attorney seeks the maximum economic value
for her client, but this battle is fought against the backdrop of legal norms
that are articulated through the case at hand, or are legislated in response to
the accumulation of experience in cases. The rules regarding alimony and
68. I do not want to discount the importance of, and perhaps the growing significance of, the
‘‘therapeutic jurisprudence’’ movement. This trend is represented generally in the work of
scholars who argue that law should provide more than a dispute resolution procedure, and
have encouraged the reconsideration of legal procedures and institutions in light of their effect
on the parties. Examples include Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Law as a Helping Profession ,
ed. Dennis P. Stolle et al. (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2000); Law in a Therapeutic
Key: Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence , eds. David B. Wexler and Bruce J. Winick
(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1996); Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence , eds. David B.
Wexler and Bruce J. Winick (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1991). This movement
recognizes that the legal imposition of communal values can exacerbate the personal strife of
the individuals engaged in a dispute, and attempts to resolve matters in an integrated manner
that attends both to the needs of the community and to the lived experience of those involved
in the specific legal matter.
There are a number of related developments, such as the rise of the mediation movement.
For example, Nancy Welsh has written about the potential for mediation to introduce
procedural justice into the settlement of litigated civil cases, thus affirming the social value and
dignity of litigants who then are more likely to perceive the courts and their settlement efforts
as legitimate. Nancy A. Welsh, ‘‘Disputants’ Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation:
A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice,’’ Journal of Dispute Resolution (2002), p. 179;
Nancy A. Welsh, ‘‘Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do
With It?,’’ Washington University Law Quarterly, 79 (2001), p. 787.
More specifically, the principles of ‘‘therapeutic jurisprudence’’ have had a large impact
on family law scholarship and law reform. As explained recently in the context of exploring
how courts deal with substance-abusing fathers,
therapeutic jurisprudence involves the study of family law as a social force in the lives of
family systems affected by paternal substance abuse with acknowledgment that legal
proceedings can have both positive and negative consequences for fathers, mothers, and
children. Ultimately the value of any legal process is determined by the extent to which it
enhances the well-being of the people it affects, and the goal of legal reform is to restructure
court systems so that they maximize the therapeutic consequences of legal intervention.
Thomas J. McMahon and Francis Gianni, ‘‘Moving from Popular Stereotypes to Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,’’ Family Court Review, 41 (2003), pp. 347  48. Toward this end, a number of
scholars advocate for a unified family court system that would serve families therapeutically,
rather than merely responding sporadically to discrete legal conflicts that involve members of
the family. Examples include Barbara Babb, ‘‘Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for
Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court,’’ Southern
California Law Review, 71 (1998), p. 469; Barbara Babb, ‘‘An Interdisciplinary Approach to
Family Law Jurisprudence: Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective,’’ Indiana
Law Journal , 72 (1997), p. 775.

Downloaded from lch.sagepub.com at UNIV OF NEVADA LAS VEGAS LIB on October 7, 2010

Responding to Nietzsche

151

property settlement reflect communal understandings of how we should
justly recognize the couple’s history together and then fairly appraise how
they can best move into the future as individuals within the broader
community. These rules constantly are in play as new situations arise that
require clarification of these values. For example, when an unmarried
cohabitating partner demands alimony-type payments after the termination
of the relationship, or when a lesbian demands child support payments from
her partner after their (necessarily) non-marital relationship ends, the law
must simultaneously invent and reinscribe the norms of the wider
community. The legal resolution of these issues is not designed to rebuild
the hermeneutical ground of the couple’s relationship, but rather is designed
to reaffirm the broader bonds of the community in which the former life
partners continue to live. The communal interest is even more apparent in
the heart-wrenching battles over child custody, when the law seeks to elevate
the communal value of promoting the ‘‘best interests of the child’’ over the
bitter strife of the competing parents who may be pursuing venal and meanspirited ends.
One should not confuse the hermeneutical function of law with a rosyeyed view that litigation effectively instantiates justice in all cases. The law,
no less than life partners, too frequently devolves into a contest of wills that
betrays its important role in facilitating community. But to recognize that a
‘‘perfect’’ legal system is as elusive as the ‘‘perfect’’ marriage only highlights
that it is the very idea of ‘‘perfect’’ in these contexts that raises difficulties.
Gadamer’s lesson is not that legal practice is a guarantor of hermeneutical
integrity, but rather that legal practice reveals the hermeneutical potential of
textual traditions, which have indelibly shaped the modern age. Legal
practice has the potential to enact a form of Smith’s ‘‘original argument,’’
although the predominantly textual character of legal practice certainly
means that the risky openness to another is experienced differently. A more
genuine ‘‘conversation’’ emerges in legal practice when the parties break
from the routinized bureaucracy and attend to the questions of justice in the
case at hand. This provides the opening for Nietzschean critical insight, not
as a dictate from principles on high, but as an announcement from within
practice.69 Nietzsche’s announcement that Christianity had run its course in
Western culture drew from his many contemporaries and precursors and
itself was a product of Christian acculturation. Similarly, lawyers who
challenge the conventional understanding of family law in new contexts
simultaneously work within and against legal traditions (as well as within
and against cultural, political, and economic traditions).
Gadamer’s notion of interpretive Destruktion incorporates critical insight.
Law is neither a purely mechanical and deductive exercise, nor is it just a
clash of power. The decision in In the Matter of Jacob70 by the New York
69. This is the enduring wisdom of Holmes’s pragmatism: law is not a ‘‘brooding omnipresence in
the sky’’ that operates ‘‘logically,’’ but rather is a practical engagement grounded in
‘‘experience.’’
70. 636 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1995).
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Court of Appeals provides an example of the Destruktive element at work in
the family law context. The Court considered a consolidated appeal
regarding two petitions for adoption: in one case the biological mother
wished to consent to the adoption of her child by her co-habitating partner,
and in the other case the biological mother wished to consent to the
adoption of her child by her co-habitating female partner. These petitions
were problematic because the adoption statutes permitted only an ‘‘adult
unmarried person’’ or ‘‘an adult husband and his adult wife’’ to adopt, and
also provided that upon adoption the ‘‘natural parents of the adoptive child
shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for
and shall have no rights over such adoptive child . . .’’71 Reading these
statutory provisions in a crudely literal manner suggested that the biological
mothers’ legal rights must be terminated upon the adoption of the children
by their co-habitating partners. Reading these statutory provisions against
the background assumption that adoption was not designed to permit an
unmarried adult to share parental rights with the biological mother
suggested that the adoptions could not proceed in the first instance. By a
narrow margin, the Court read the adoption statutes to permit the
biological mothers to retain parental rights when their co-habitating
partners adopted the children.
The dissenting judges assailed this case as an example of improper
judicial lawmaking, arguing that ‘‘cobbling law together out of interpretive
ambiguity that transforms fundamental, societally recognized relationships
and substantive principles is neither sound statutory construction nor
justifiable lawmaking.’’72 Partisan political campaigns emphasize the social
stakes for judicial appointments in similar terms, concluding that judicial
will to power is the name of the game rather than reasoned elaboration. But
a careful reading of the case makes clear that the majority does not simply
recognize unmarried partners as suitable adoptive parents and then spin a
gossamer of legal analysis to hide its exercise of raw power. The majority
opinion provides a detailed interpretation of the statutes in the context of
the case at hand, and delivers a critical assessment of that context. Space
constraints preclude a detailed reconstruction of the opinion, but the court
clearly is thinking through inherited concepts and language in charting a
new path for the development of law rather than creating an entirely new
path. If it appears other-worldly to talk of Destruktion as the revitalizing of
lifeless concepts by working through them without purporting to overcome
them, the majority opinion in Jacob provides a concrete example of this
process at work.
The Court begins by noting the underlying purpose of the adoption
statute  to secure the best possible homes for children  and then
concludes that the adoption statutes do permit two unmarried adults who
function as a child’s parents to obtain legal status as parents. This is not
71. The court was interpreting N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 110 and N.Y. Domestic Relations
Law § 117.
72. In the Matter of Jacob, 636 N.Y.S. 2d at 733 (Bellacosa, dissenting).
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purely a result-oriented exercise, inasmuch as the court carefully recounts
legislative developments and administrative regulations that have effectuated this purpose under the statutory scheme. The court articulates what the
law means in the current context and does not create law ex nihilo, even if
the interpretation of the statutes involves a simultaneous critique of the
context in which it is applied. This is Destruktion in action, and is precisely
what Gadamer attempts to capture by characterizing legal texts as
containing a ‘‘free space of meaningful concretization that has to carry
out the interpretation for the purpose of practical application’’ through the
‘‘creative legal function’’ of applying the law to a set of facts. This is possible
by virtue of the community of legal interpreters who reinscribe (which is to
say, critically and creatively apply) communal values in the manner in which
they adjudicate family law disputes. Interestingly, both formalists and
radical deconstructionists would argue that Destruktion provides cover for the
imposition of political will, with the former retreating to a mythical linguistic
‘‘plain meaning’’ to serve as an anchor while the latter embrace the ‘‘free
play’’ of the text. Both perspectives ring hollow in the ears of lawyers and
judges who struggle through the de-centering experience of interpretation,
and experience of Destruktion that animates Gadamer’s middle path.
Finally, Smith’s family law example assumes that the role of the lawyer is
just to resolve interpretive disputes within a textual tradition. In fact, the
lawyer’s role as counselor is paramount, even though it is often forgotten in
the litigation models that dominate even Gadamer’s image of legal practice.
Much of legal practice involves deliberating with one’s clients in order to
determine the best means (often in tandem with other professionals such as
accountants, therapists, doctors, and others) of realizing their clients’ goals
within the given situation. The first hermeneutical challenge for a lawyer is
to hear her client’s story and to enable the client to understand competing
stories told by the client’s adversary and by the society writ large. The
rhetorical exchanges that comprise the lawyer client relationship in the
initial interviews preceding a divorce are key features of an original
argument that eventually might be translated and filtered into legal briefs
and motion arguments. The client’s pain and anguish is heard and felt by
the lawyer when she is representing her client effectively, and it is this
corporeal experience that the lawyer brings into the legal venue for a
hearing. The interactions of lawyers and judges in settlement conferences,
pretrial hearings, negotiations and even within the stylized drama of
litigation raise the potential for understanding through full-bodied original
argument.

IV. Conclusion
Smith’s argument that law is a contest of wills that might benefit from
Nietzschean insight but cannot aspire to Gadamerian dialogue rests on too
narrow a reading of Gadamer’s revival of Heideggerian Destruktion and too
narrow a picture of legal practice. The hermeneutical-rhetorical reality of
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legal practice points toward a text-based experience of ‘‘original argument’’
that cannot be completely covered over by the pretense of logical formalism.
Gadamer is correct: legal practice is exemplary. Because the rhetoric of legal
practice is to deny its rhetoricity, however, legal practice cannot be taken at
its word, but only in its activity. Smith argues that legal practice covers over
the original argument of belonging, but Gadamer shows that legal practice
resists the leveling descriptions offered by too many of its participants and
instead represents a belonging-together and community-of-interest that is
mediated textually rather than corporeally. The task of critical legal theory
is to facilitate Destruktion, a creative overcoming that is always potentially
present but all too often is concealed in the overt moves of practice. Legal
theorists oriented by this understanding of law can avoid the twin dangers of
deductive formalism and postmodern ennui. Rather than attempting to set a
methodological agenda that would straight-jacket practice with top-down
conceptions of how practice should unfold, or standing aloof by ironically
refusing to engage in the dynamism of practice, critical legal theory should
work from a Nietzschean model of critique and on the basis of a
Gadamerian dialogic model of interpretation. In this paper I have charted
the ontological space in which this critical activity can flourish, with a few
examples offered as guideposts. The project of critical legal theory is to
unleash the dynamism of practice through Destruktion, to render original
argument audible once again, even if only as a whisper amidst the
cacophony of power and domination that mark the bureaucratic imperatives of modern law.
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